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Abstract 
In the public policy literature, there is a widespread belief that industry self-regulation would 
only take place—and lead to satisfactory results—if industry was faced with a credible threat 
of hierarchical government intervention. At the example of intermodal transport 
standardization, however, this paper demonstrates that this does not have to be the case. It 
may even have a counterproductive effect by exposing self-regulatory processes to political 
contestation. 
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Political Contestation in the Shadow 
of Hierarchy  
 
1. Introduction 
In the public policy literature, there appears to be a widespread assumption 
that industry self– or co–regulation would only occur—and lead to 
satisfactory results—where industry was faced with a credible threat of 
hierarchical interventions through legislative or executive decisions.  
Assuming that industry wants to prevent such intervention, proponents of 
this ‘shadow-of-hierarchy’ hypothesis argue that the threat of revising 
existing or introducing further secondary legislation would prompt industry 
to engage in self-regulation.  
While this argument has been around for a while, the most recent version of 
the shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis was formulated specifically in response 
to the increasing attention to new forms of governance that include private 
actors and/or do not rely on conventional public policy-making processes 
(Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011, see). In the face of the rapidly advancing pace of 
technological change and economic internationalization, public actors are 
often considered unable to provide the governance functions they used. As 
they are still commonly expected to provide these functions, they increasingly 
have to rely on private actors.  Although public actors may be dependent on 
private rule-makers and although there appears to have been a large rise in 
such new, private modes of governance, the recent shadow-of-hierarchy 
literature suggests that private governance was not as private as it seemed, 
for there would not be any private governance if it was not for the public 
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shadow of hierarchy. If one scratched the surface of these new, non-
hierarchical modes of governance, Rhodes and Visser (2011, p. 123) argues, 
one is likely to find old, hierarchical modes underneath. Without the shadow 
of hierarchy, this literature suggests, self– or co–regulation would not take 
place. It is considered a necessary condition for self– or co–regulation to 
succeed.  
The case of intermodal transport standardization, which is discussed in this 
paper, however, demonstrates that this does not need to be case. After 
industry self-regulation had already led to first positive results, the European 
Commission sought to promote this process by issuing an implicit though 
credible threat to introduce draconian legislation. Immediately after this 
shadow of hierarchy was formulated, however, the self-regulatory process 
began to fail. Instead of facilitating private governance, this case suggests that 
the shadow of hierarchy merely appears to have exacerbated the collective 
action and decision-making problems inherent to private rule-making 
processes. Instead of representing a necessary condition of self-or co-
regulation, it appears to have been a prohibiting condition.  
The threat of hierarchical intervention was formulated in comparatively 
favorable circumstances. Therefore, this outcome is rather puzzling. The 
Commission’s threat to intervene through the introduction of secondary 
legislation was perceived to be very credible. Therefore, the main necessary 
condition—-i.e. credibility—of the shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis appears to 
have been met (Héritier & Eckert, 2008, p. 116), further underlining the 
question why the shadow of hierarchy failed to have the desired and 
predicted effect. Moreover, governmental actors, including the Commission, 
European Parliament and Council, could build on a comparatively high 
degree of control over the private governance process, which represents 
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another necessary condition identified by the recent shadow of hierarchy 
literature.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
case of self-regulation in the intermodal transport industry and the effect of 
the sudden formulation of the shadow of hierarchy. Section 3 tries to explain 
the shadow’s counterproductive effect and draw generalizable conclusions 
from the case study. 
 
2. European Intermodal Transport Standardization  
The case of self-regulation discussed in this article took the form of private 
industry standardization. Technical standards are generally developed in 
private, industry-driven standards-writing organizations, which stand 
outside of—and tend to be completely independent from—conventional 
policy-making processes. Although technical standards are usually unnoticed 
unless they are missing—as anyone that will be able to confirm who, while 
traveling, has been confronted with an incompatible electricity socket—they 
fulfill a variety of important governance functions. At the one end of the 
spectrum, reference and quality standards signal consumers that a specific 
product or service is “fit for purpose” (ISO, 2005, p. 10), complying with a set 
of health, safety, or environmental quality levels etc. Thereby technical 
standards significantly increase the efficiency of economic transactions by 
resolving information asymmetries regarding the quality of products between 
buyers and sellers (Akerlof, 1970). On the other hand, compatibility and 
interface standards govern the technological and transactional 
interconnectivity between different goods and services (David and Greenstein 
1990; David and Steinmueller, 1994, p. 218).
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In this case, technical standardization took place in CEN (European 
Committee for Standardization) and more specifically its Technical 
Committee for Swap bodies for combined goods transport (TC119). The 
purpose of technical standardization was to improve the integration of air, 
rail, road, inland waterways, short and deep-sea transport modes by 
developing a loading unit—or shipping container—which was compatible 
with the needs and requirements of all modes of transports thus increasing 
intermodal interoperability. According to the notion of ‘intermodalism’, 
which constituted the dominant policy paradigm of the 1990s and the early 
2000s, the combination of multiple modes of transport was considered 
necessary to take advantage of each mode’s inherent economies to unleash 
unused capacities, to relieve pressure on the existing infrastructure, and to 
reduce carbon emissions, road congestion and accidents (EC, 1995).  
Until the early 1990s, a large variety of distinctly different and thus 
incompatible loading units circulated through the European transport system. 
The standardized international shipping container was hardly used in intra-
European transport. The problem with the international shipping container, 
which was standardized by the International Standardization Organization 
(ISO) and which, in the words of Levinson (2006), “made the world smaller 
and the world economy bigger,” was that it was incompatible with the 
shipping pallets commonly used in Europe.1
 
As illustrated by Figure 1, the 
ISO Series 1 containers sacrifice valuable cargo space. For the cost of 
transporting and handling full or only half-full loading units tends to be 
almost the same, the international container has a competitive disadvantage 
against containers that are optimized for the transportation of pallets.2
 
At the 
                                                        
1 The international container standard specified the dimensions, handling equipment, 
terminology, ratings and identification markings of containers. Four different containers of 10, 
20, 30 and 40 feet were adopted.  
2 The price that container terminals charge per crane lift, for instance, is fixed and also labor 
costs, the highest cost factor in road transport, are the same. 
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same time pallets could not be adapted to the new container standard. 
Although wooden pallets would be relatively inexpensive to replace, 
assembly lines and warehouses across Europe were already optimized for the 
handling of pallets. Adapting these to the international container standard, 
however, would be prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the ISO container 
never gained any significant market shares in intra-European transport. In 
international transport—including the transport in and out of Europe—
however, it is the uncontested de facto standard.  
Instead of developing a single common standard for intra-European transport 
in response to the incompatibility of the international container standard with 
European pallet standards, however, European industry responded in a 
largely uncoordinated way. Multiple, mostly incompatible, loading units 
were developed, without paying sufficient attention to loss of efficiency that 
this meant for the entire transport system as a whole. Operators from each 
mode of transport—road, rail, short sea and inland waterway—largely 
followed their own technical preferences in the development of new loading 
units, as summarized in Table 1. While sea and inland waterway transport 
operators were interested in stack-ability, for instance, road haulers sought to 
minimize the tare weight of loading units in order to reduce fuel 
consumption. Therefore, they tend to favor light-build loading units and were 
not interest in stack-ability.3
  
Deep-sea transport operators, however, did not 
prefer pallet-wide containers because all modern containers vessels are 
nowadays fitted with cellular frames that increases load stability at sea and 
accelerate the (dis)charging process in port. Instead, they tend to have a 
strong preference for extra high loading units—also known as ‘high-cube’ 
containers. Rail transport operators, in turn, had no interested in stack-ability 
                                                        
3 This lead to the development of the swap body. This un-stackable loading unit owes its name to 
four up-folding legs that make it possible to ‘swap’ them from one trailer to another, or to leave 
them at a loading bay, without the help of a crane. 
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either but required lift-able loading units.  
The heterogeneity of loading units and the lack of common standards had 
devastating consequences for the European economy and environment. It 
significantly increases transportation costs.4
 
The lack of interoperability 
between systems often required the reloading of fright from one loading unit 
to another, whenever a national or modal boundaries were crossed, thus 
defeating the purpose of containerization. The excessive heterogeneity of 
loading units also undermined automation, jeopardizing potential efficiency 
increases even further. Moreover, the lack of standardization significantly 
increases the number of empty back-hauls, exacerbating the problem of traffic 
congestion. Europe’s trucks run empty 35% to 40% of the time (Freudmann, 
1999). And in lack of interoperability standards it lead to an underutilization 
of non-road modes of transport. According to Eurostat (2007, p. 68) 72% of all 
inland fright transport is still carried out by road. This did not only lead to 
more road congestion but also increased the number of accidents and 
environmental pollution.5
 
 
By the mid-1990s, however, a group of firms that had specialized in the 
combination of rail and road transport—and therefore became known as the 
combined transport industry—decided to do something about lack of 
common standards. As the transfer of freight between different modes was at 
the core of their business, the combined transport operators had a natural 
interest in intermodal interoperability. Therefore, they started to meet in the 
TC119 of CEN to start working on common standards.  
After long negotiations within the TC119, the standard-setters eventually 
                                                        
4 The European transport industry accounts for 7% of the EU’s gross national product (GNP), 7% 
of all jobs, which is quite large considering that it is merely meant to be an intermediary 
(Eurostat, 2007). 
5 The transport sector accounts for 30% of the Community’s energy consumption and the 
maintenance and adaption of the transport infrastructure ties 40% of member states’ public 
investment (Eurostat, 2007). 
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came to a preliminary agreement on the basic parameters of a long and a 
short intermodal loading unit, in May 1997 (see Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 
1997). Both versions appeared to represent the state-of-the-art in container 
design. Despite the fact the units clearly reflected TC119’s bias toward 
combined transport operators—which mainly manifests itself in the units’ 
comparatively large width; waterborne transport operators would have 
preferred narrower units—both loading units constituted a vast improvement 
compared to the existing units used in intra-European transport. The 
proposed units’ increased loading capacity should have outweighed all short 
term adaptation costs. In contrast to the comparable ISO container, which can 
only accommodate a maximum of 25 pallets, the proposed unit would have 
been able to accommodate up to 33 pallets. That would have meant an 
increase of 21% in transport capacity. Moreover, the units were designed to be 
stackable and top-liftable—crucial requirements for canal and sea transport. 
All participants of the intra-European transport community could be expected 
to benefit from the introduction of such a loading unit standard. Moreover, it 
was estimated that an average drop in overall logistics cost by two percent 
could be achieved for containerized dry cargo moving four hundred 
kilometers or further and that the final delivered price of many consumer 
goods could be reduced by 0.02% to 0.2% (ICF Consulting, 2003, p. 4).  
In the long run, all modes of transport should have benefited from the formal 
adoption of these units as European standards. Especially the waterborne 
transport modes—though facing short term adaptation costs—should have 
been among the largest beneficiaries of the new units. The units’ pallet 
compatibility, stack-ability and top-lift-ability should have made it easier to 
integrate these modes into the transport mix. The canal shipping industry had 
traditionally suffered from the frictional costs involved in loading cargo onto 
and off canal barges. Therefore, the canal shipping industry was—and still 
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is—operating below capacity while the capacity of the European road 
network had long been exceeded. The units’ stack-ability and, especially, their 
top-lift-ability were bound to decrease these frictional costs.  
In order to support the standardization process, the European Commission, 
which had long been concerned about the lack of intermodal standards,6
 
intervened in 2003. It formulated a threat to introduce coercive secondary 
legislation mandating and/or subsidizing compliance with a single common 
European Intermodal Loading Unit (EILU) standard if industry was not going 
to agree to adopt and comply with a single common standard, i.e. the 
specifications developed by the TC119. The Commission expected the threat 
to prompt the combined transport community to intensify their 
standardization work and the remaining participants of the transport 
industry to adopt the developed standards. Based on the shadow-of hierarchy 
literature the European Commission had all reason to expect this strategy to 
work.  
This shadow of hierarchy was formulated in the context of a proposal by the 
European Commission to recognize the specifications already developed by 
the combined transport community as official European standards (EC, 2003). 
Although the formal status would have entitled the unit to free circulation 
around the single European market,7
 
it would not have obliged industry to 
adopt the standards, leaving their voluntary status untouched.8
 
The proposal 
                                                        
6 See EC (1995; 1997, p. 8; 2001).  
7 The standard would have been presumed to comply with the General Product Safety Directive 
2001/95/EC and the Directive 96/53/EC on vehicle weights and dimensions. Individual Member 
States would not have been easily been able to restrict the circulation of compliant products.  
8 It is clearly stated in the proposal that all types of loading units, including both swap bodies and 
iso Series 1 containers, can remain on the market as long as they comply with the safety and 
security norms defined in the international Convention for Safe Containers (1972) (Article 2(b) 
and Annex I), of which all EU member states are signatories. While the Convention for Safe 
Containers already applies to iso Series 1 containerss, swap bodies have been so far been 
exempted. Only the new EILU, however, would additionally have to comply with the dimensions 
and handling features specified in the proposed Directive (Article 2(c) and Annex II). The 
proposal thus is not the enactment of the threat attached to it. 
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itself was thus mostly symbolical. However, the Commission attached an 
implicit threat to it suggesting that it would introduce further legislation 
providing positive and/or negative sanctions to promote compliance with 
loading unit standards. The Commission never clarified what steps it would 
take. As a result, rumors soon emerged within in the industry that the 
Commission might allow Members States to provide tax incentives (Deutsche 
Verkehrszeitung, 2004), that eligibility to Marco Polo funding might be made 
conditional on the use of and compliance with the standard, and that all non-
compliant loading units would only be allowed to remain on the market for a 
transition period of several years.  
The Commission actively nourished these speculations by refusing to clarify 
its future strategy. In a consultation paper, for instance, the Commission had 
formulated the expectation that the old loading units would gradually 
disappear from the market during the following five to fifteen years, without 
specifying whether this was going to happen through regulatory intervention 
or market forces alone. At an open forum organized by CEN, the Commission 
skillfully ignored all questions regarding this issue.9
 
 
Over the years the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) 
had gained the reputation of superimposing legislation on industry. 
According to an interviewed Commission employee, DG TREN had lost a lot 
of credit with industry due to this approach.10
 
Furthermore, the Commission 
had accumulated broad competences in transport policy.11 As a result, 
industry perceived the shadow of hierarchy to be very credible, despite the 
                                                        
9 CEN (2003), EC (2002), Interview 8 with a representative of the combined transport industry 
(2009).  
10 Interview 2 with a representative of the European Commission, 2009. 
11 European Union (EU) Transport policy dates back to the 1958 Treaty of Rome (Article 3f and 
Title V). Over the years, the Commission had gained a considerable amount of competences in 
this domain. Article 71(1) provides a legal basis for measures to improve transport safety, an 
area where it shares jurisdiction with the Member States. Article 80(2) also provides a legal basis 
to include the maritime sector. 
Political Contestation in the Shadow of Hierarchy 
 10
fact that it had never been made explicit.  
The credibility of the Commission’s threat was furthermore reinforced by the 
procedural circumstances in which the Commission formulated the shadow 
of hierarchy. Its initial proposal to recognize the units developed by the 
combined transport community as official European standards was based on 
the New Approach procedure. This legislative innovation from 1985 (European 
Council, 1985) was meant to allow European policy-makers to gain greater 
control over private standardization processes. In contrast to the ‘old 
approach,’ which foresaw a harmonization of technical regulations and 
barriers to trade at the legislative level, the New Approach was meant to 
delegate this task to private standard-setters while Member States retained a 
high degree of control over the private standardization process (see Egan, 
1998). Through the ‘essential requirements,’ that the standard-setters had to 
comply with, Member States could control the scope, rigor, direction and 
content of the standardization process. According to the recent shadow-of-
hierarchy literature, a high degree of formal control is supposed to be 
instrumental for the credibility of the shadow of hierarchy.  
In light of the credibility of the Commission’s threat and the high degree of 
control that it awarded the European policy-makers, the shadow of hierarchy 
should thus have been expected to prompt an intensification of the European 
transport industry’s standardization efforts. This expectation is amplified by 
the facilitating circumstances that the private standardization process had 
almost been completed by the TC119 community already. Industry simply 
needs to adopt the specifications already developed. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the loading units specified in the TC119 seemed to provide 
large and relatively evenly spread gains to all participants of the intra-
European transport industry.  
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In practice, however, the shadow of hierarchy appears to have had the 
opposite effect. First, the result was that many actors that were previously not 
involved in the standardization process suddenly started to participate. If the 
adopted standard was ever to become mandatory, actors wanted to make 
sure that the standard was aligned with their own technical preferences or 
simply to prevent it from being adopted. Actors that had previously shied 
away from the high costs of participating, such as the road, short-sea and 
inland waterways operators, joined the standardization process. This led to a 
significant increase in the number and heterogeneity of participants (see Table 
1). The consensus that had existed within CEN and within the policy arena 
was destroyed. As a result CEN never called for a vote on the issue. It was 
clear that there no longer was a sufficient majority within.  
Outside of CEN, the opponents of the EILU standard also used the public-
decision making process to raise their voice. The public policy-making 
process turned out to be much more accessible then the private decision-
making process within CEN’s TC119. Unlike the latter, the former did not 
require any significant financial commitments and technical expertise from 
the opponents of the EILUs standard. A representative of the European Barge 
Union, for instance, suggested that the inland-waterway operators would 
neither have the time, resources nor expertise to participate in the 
standardization process.12
 
In the political debate, however, the operators were 
able to play an active and influential role through the European Barge Union.  
The public decision-making process provided the EILU opponents with an 
opportunity to challenge the proposed standard on two levels. First, they 
tried to undermine the legitimacy of the TC119 community and the 
Commission’s proposal by emphasizing the redistributive implications of the 
                                                        
12 Interview 14 with a representative of the inland waterway industry (2009).  
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proposed standards redistributive implications of technical standardization 
and by pointing out the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the TC119 
community’s argumentation to justify their technical choices. The European 
Barge Union, for instance, argued that because EILUs are wider than ISO 
containers many barges will only be able to place three instead of four loading 
units latter next to each other. This would mean a loss of loading capacity of 
25%. While this problem could be circumvented by adapting the design of 
barges, as suggested by the combined transport community, the canal 
transport operators argued that the EILUs were still too high for most bridges, 
ports and terminals. Therefore, the introduction of the EILUs would not only 
require massive private but also public investments (CEN, 2003; European 
Barge Union, 2004, pp. 19–21).  
The deep-sea shipping operators, to mention a second example, pointed out 
another important weakness in the TC119 community’s argumentation. The 
latter had consistently argued that the EILU cannot be compatible with both 
international containers as well as the pallets used in Europe. And since the 
latter where much more important in intra-European transport, it was argued, 
the EILU should sacrifice container compatibility. A representative of the 
deep sea shipper NEN-Norfolk line, however, pointed out that there was a 
way to achieve both by using the thin-wall technology developed by the 
container manufacturer GE SeaCo.13
 
 
Secondly, the EILU opponents used the debate to launch a counter-
narrative—co-modalism—against the dominant policy paradigm of 
intermodalism upon which the EILU proposal was based. In contrast to 
intermodalism, which implied the policy objective of modal shift and the 
forcing of fright off the road, co-modalism had the objective of maximizing 
                                                        
13 CEN (2003), Interview 13 with a participant of CEN’s TC119 (2009), Interview 18 with a 
container manufacturer (2009).  
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the efficiency of each mode of transport in its own right. The underlying logic 
of co-modality is that once each mode is allowed to achieve its full potential, 
fright traffic would automatically shift to the most efficient combination of 
modes. Instead of pushing freight traffic to what is perceived to be the most 
efficient combination of modes of transport, the new policy objective is to rely 
on the market pull transport volumes to the most efficient modes. 14
 
In contrast 
to intermodalism, co-modalism does not provide a direct role for government 
intervention. The idea of co-modalism soon won many adherents. The road 
transport and shipping operators used this counter narrative to call for a 
revision of Directive 96/53/EC on vehicle weights and dimensions to permit 
alternative larger and longer loading units, such as the 45 foot containers and 
longer road-trains—the gigaliners—in intra-European transport (Brookes, 
2006; Stares, 2006).15
 
 
Although the EILU opponents managed to point out important weaknesses of 
the EILU proponents’ arguments, the EILU still factually remained a large 
improvement to the existing situation. As a result of this discourse, however, 
the combined transport community seemed to have lost control of the issue 
once the standardization process had shifted from the TC119 into the political 
arena. The alliance could no longer control the nature and terms nor the locus 
of and participants in the debate. And as it was no longer able to shape the 
standards according to their own technical and strategic preference, the 
alliance that was once providing the expertise and financial muscle for the 
standardization process lost interest.  
                                                        
14 Interview b3 with a representative of the road haulage industry (2009), Interview b5 with a 
representative of the road haulage industry (2009).  
15 The 45 foot container did not comply with Directive 96/53/EC because it exceed the allowed 
dimensions. The Directive stipulates 16,650 mm as the maximum permissible length for vehicles 
on Europe’s roads, with a maximum load length of 13,600 mm. The 45 foot container, however, is 
13,720 meters long, exceeding the limit by no more than 80 mm. To give industry a chance to 
slowly withdraw the 45 footers from the market, a ‘grandfather clause’ had been included into 
the Directive (Article 4(6)). This clause allowed Member States to permit the container on their 
roads for a transition period of ten years after September 1997.  
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While the shadow of hierarchy raised the stakes of the game and thereby 
multiplied the number of actors involved, the formalization of legislative 
influence and control over the technical standardization process through the 
New Approach also caused a multiplication of veto points. The New Approach 
procedure required the European Parliament and the Council to agree to the 
essential requirements of the unit through the co-decision procedure before 
the standardization process could be formally delegated to CEN. This 
provided the EILU opponents with two extra veto points.  
Road haulers and deep-sea shipping quickly managed to convince the 
Council not to support the proposal. After only one round of discussions, the 
Dutch Council presidency decided that the proposal did not have sufficient 
support and removed it from the agenda.16
 
 
The European Parliament (EP) initially endorsed the Commission’s 
proposal but the deep-sea shipping operators, against the recommendation 
of the TC119, managed to convince the Parliament to decrease the EILU’s 
external width, so that it would fit into the cellular frame of container 
vessels but would not be able to transport pallets (EP, 2004).17
 
 
Ironically, however, even the Commission was eventually transformed into 
an additional veto point. During the debate individual members of DG 
TREN embraced the counter narrative of co-modalism to advance their own 
agenda and position within the DG. Co-modalism was increasingly 
perceived by many in the Commission as a more pragmatic alternative to 
intermodalism. After a re-shuffling of units and responsibilities within DG 
TREN in consequence of the appointment of a new Commission, the 
proponents of Commission were suddenly stronger than the proponents of 
                                                        
16 Interview 3 with a representative of the road haulage industry (2009), Interview 5 with a 
representative of the road haulage industry (2009).  
17 In its amended proposal from 2004, the Commission changed the width back to 2,550 mm (EC, 
2004). 
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intermodalism (Interview 2 with a representative of the European 
Commission, 2009). On March 25, 2008 the Commission finally withdrew 
the EILU proposal (Dahm, 2009; Wahl, January 23, 2009). Moreover, the new 
DG TREN ‘reinterpreted’ the relevant clauses of the Directive on 
dimensions and weights (EC, 2006) and permitted the 45 foot container. The 
Maritime Industries Forum had long pushed for this step (Brookes, 2006; 
Stares, 2006).  
This drew the last nail into the coffin of the EILU. The dilution of the 
existing legislation on vehicle weights and dimensions rendered the EILU 
uncompetitive against larger loading units. The intra-European transport 
industry remained stuck with a large number of incompatible, though 
larger, loading units. Self-regulation had failed and the shadow of hierarchy 
appears to have had an unexpected and counterproductive effect.  
 
3. Explaining the Unexpected and Counterproductive 
Effect 
This Section investigates the question why the shadow of hierarchy failed to 
lead to the expected intensification of industry self-regulation, despite the 
presence of rather favorable circumstances. The case study of inter modal 
transport standardization appears to have revealed two weaknesses of the 
shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis. First, it appears to overemphasize industry’s 
desire to prevent regulatory interventions. The shadow-of-hierarchy 
hypotheses is based on the assumption that when it comes to regulation, 
industry’s first preference was to thwart legislation (Bartolini, 2011, p. 9; 
Héritier & Eckert, 2008, p. 1). “Firms—as a rule—shun public intervention 
into their economic activities,” Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 55) argue. 
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Therefore, industry is expected to prefer self-regulation as the lesser evil to 
top down legislation or regulation for it provides industry with a greater 
flexibility and influence over the definition of regulatory measures 
(Boddewyn, 1992). To prevent legislative interventions competing companies 
would therefore be willing to collaboratively develop and adopt self-
regulatory measures.  
While it may be true that companies will seek to prevent the introduction of 
secondary legislation that will weaken their competitive position against their 
competitors, the public choice literature has shown that companies may be 
just as likely to actively demand legislative interventions where these provide 
them with a competitive edge over their competitors (Stigler, 1975; Becker, 
1983; Peltzman, 1984). In the case of intermodal transport standardization 
some proponents of the EILU, such as the combined transport operators, may 
have welcomed the introduction of secondary legislation strengthening the 
deployment of and compliance with their preferred container standard. 
Moreover, companies can also be expected to prefer the level of governance—
hierarchical, self– or co–regulation— that provides them with the greatest 
influence over the outcome of these processes. Their preferences can be 
expected to depend on two factors: First, the structure of the market and 
firms’ respective position therein; and secondly, their respective influence in 
the formulation of regulatory measures at the different levels of governance. 
Moreover, firms’ regulatory preferences can also be expected to vary with 
regards to the content as well as the rigor of regulatory measures. Usually, 
there is a choice between several (self-)regulatory measures to achieve a 
certain regulatory objective. In the case of technical standardization, for 
instance, different technologies can be chosen as the technological basis for a 
common technical standard. However, technical standardization seems to be 
far from an exception. There appears to be an increasing number of cases 
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where governmental actors merely specify what policy goals are to be 
achieved and leave the choice how to reach these goals to private firms 
themselves (Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2005, p. 483). As different firms tend to 
favor different measures to achieve these, this choice cannot be expected to be 
free of conflict. In short, the shadow-of-hierarchy literature’s assumption that 
firms’ first preference was to prevent regulation is too restrictive. It rarely 
seems to hold and if it does it is unlikely to apply to all industry participants.  
Given the fact that self-regulation usually requires directly competing firms to 
agree to a common set of self-regulatory measures for self-regulation to 
succeed, the divergence of firms’ regulatory preferences— regarding the level, 
rigor and content of regulation—should be expected to be constrained by 
significant decision-making problems. The definition and adoption of self-
regulatory measures may fail—even where firms share a strong interest in the 
prevention of public legislation—if firms’ regulatory preferences are 
incompatible. Therefore, the join-decision traps that are considered to 
constrain public decision-making (Scharpf, 2006), can also be expected to 
undermine private decision-making. This has been largely overlooked by the 
governance literature. Since there is an increasing number of cases where 
governmental actors only specify what goals are to be achieved and let 
industry decide how to achieve these goals (Jordan et al., 2005, p. 483), such 
decision-making problems can be expected to gain in prominence.  
The second weakness of the shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis appears to be 
that it neglects the crucial role of intransparency and exclusiveness in self-
regulation. Given the heterogeneous preferences and given the decision-
making problems that result from the former, the only situation in which 
companies are able to agree to common self-regulatory measures appears to 
be one where participation in self-regulatory processes is limited to a small 
group of companies that share a set of compatible preferences. For better or 
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worse, exclusiveness thus appears to be a necessary condition of self-
regulation. Where the number and heterogeneity of rule-makers is reduced, 
there is a larger scope for mutually acceptable agreements on common self-
regulatory measures. Moreover, collective decision making in small and 
homogeneous groups firms tends to be facilitated by the fact that are more 
likely to realize their mutual dependence and replace strategic bargaining 
with more deliberative forms of interaction, such as learning and collective 
problem-solving Porter (1979, p. 215). In the case of intermodal transport 
standardization, for instance, the development of first technical specifications 
for a European loading unit through the TC119 was facilitated by the fact that 
it was dominated by the combined transport community and that most 
industry participants with diverging preferences were excluded from the 
development and decision-making process. The political science literature 
provides plenty examples of such exclusive circles such as policy monopolies 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), whirlpools, sub-governments, iron triangles 
(Freeman, 1955), issue networks, unitary advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988) 
etc.  
Exclusiveness commonly appears to be achieved in two ways. First, 
individual firms may deliberately choose not to participate in the definition of 
self-regulatory measures. Some firms may not have the necessary financial 
means and technical expertise. As suggested by Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011, 
p. 55), self-regulation is costly to devise and implement (also see Börzel, 2007, 
p. 7). Other firms may choose not to participate out of rational ignorance. 
They may speculate that the process will either not succeed or that the 
eventual cost of adapting to the resulting self-regulatory measures will not 
exceed the cost of participating in the process to shape the measures 
according to their own preferences. As suggested by Bartolini (2011), 
participation in governance arrangements is by definition voluntary. “Opting 
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out is always possible, provided one is willing to bear the costs” (Bartolini, 
2011).  
Secondly, exclusiveness may also be achieved through the active exclusion of 
rival companies from participation. Companies often have a strong interest in 
excluding their competitors from the process in order to be able to shape self-
regulatory measures according to their own preferences. A particularly 
common strategy to promote and justify the limited stakeholder participation 
is to present the definition of self-regulatory measures as a purely ‘technical’ 
process and to deemphasize potential normative and (re)distributive 
implications (see Radaelli, 1999, p. 759). Another frequently used strategy is to 
link self-regulation to widely accepted political objectives such as health, 
safety, growth and competitiveness.  
Despite their voluntary nature, a large number of ‘rule-takers’ tends to adopt 
the self-regulatory measures defined by the exclusive circle of rule-makers. 
Compliance tends to be driven by a variety of mechanisms, including:  
• Incorporation into private contracts, as a defense against tort or as in 
insurance policies (Majone, 1996, pp. 23-26);  
• Learning, mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991);  
• Setting market expectations of safety and reliability; and  
• Network effects that progressively increase the benefit of compliance 
with the number of compliant parties, as discussed above.  
As a result of industry’s heterogeneous preferences and the crucial role of 
exclusiveness in self-regulation, the formulation of the shadow of hierarchy is 
likely to have two consequences.  
First, it can be expected to multiply the number of actors participating— i.e. 
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veto players—in the self– or co–regulatory processes. The shadow of 
hierarchy raises the stakes of the game. Expecting that such interventions will 
increase the chances that they may eventually have to comply with the given 
self–regulatory measures, firms will actively push into the definition process 
in order to make sure that the resulting measures are in line with their 
preferences. As suggested by the shadow-of-hierarchy literature, firms can be 
expected to overcome their collective action problems and start to participate 
(Börzel, 2007, p. 6; Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011, p. 2; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995, 
pp. 21-23). Even firms that previously chose to remain rationally ignorant can 
be expected to start to participate. For that reason the canal, rail and deep sea 
transport operators started to participate in the standardization process after 
the Commission’s threat to subsidize and mandate compliance with the EILU. 
Moreover, the raised stakes of the game should make it more profitable for 
firms that have less to loose from hierarchical intervention and less to gain 
from self-regulation to hold out agreement against firms that have more to 
gain from self-regulation. Given the heterogeneity of regulatory preferences, 
an increase in the number participants can be expected to reduce the scope for 
a mutually acceptable agreement on common regulatory measures.  
While the increase participation may be desirable from democratic 
standpoint, it causes the shadow of hierarchy to have the unintended effect of 
exacerbating the inherent decision-making problems of industry self-
regulatory processes. Industry will be less likely to agree to common self-
regulatory measures. This is diametrically opposed to the shadow-of-
hierarchy hypothesis that “[g]overnment envisaging first legislative steps or 
the tightening of existing legislation prompts self-regulation by industry” 
(Héritier & Eckert, 2008, p. 116).  
Secondly, hierarchical interventions, as in the form of negative or positive 
sanctions, open up new veto points to actors that have less to gain or even 
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expect to loose from self-regulation. In pluralist political systems, the 
enactment of the threat to introduce sanctioning legislation or executive 
decisions conventionally requires the consent of—or is subjected to the 
scrutiny of—other public actors, such as Parliaments and courts. These 
provide opponents of a particular self-regulatory arrangement or self-
regulation in general with effective veto points. In the European Union, 
secondary legislation is generally introduced through the co-decision 
procedure, which involves the European Council and Parliament. Both have 
veto powers. In the case of intermodal transport, the enactment of the threat 
to mandate or subsidize compliance through the introduction of secondary 
legislation, too, would have directly involved the European Parliament and 
Council. Both institutions turned out to be quite receptive to the arguments of 
the EILU opponents and prevented the Commission from taking further steps 
in the direction of forcing industry to comply with the EILU standard.  
The higher the degree of formalized public control over the performance of 
private self-regulators, the more likely the opponents of self-regulation are to 
appeal to public actors. This, too, is directly opposed to the hypothesis by 
Héritier and Eckert (2008, p. 117) that the more rigorous the instruments of 
control over industry, the better the self-regulation would perform. While this 
may underline the credibility of the shadow of hierarchy, it also provides the 
opponents of self-regulation with a strong incentive to appeal to these actors. 
In the case of intermodal transport standardization, the New Approach 
procedure lent the European Parliament and Council the authority to define 
the objectives and content of the standardization process. Therefore, the EILU 
opponents lobbied both institutions to veto the Commission’s plans.  
This shows that in contrast to self-regulatory circles, the political arena 
operates according to completely different principles. First, participation costs 
are comparatively modest, which allows a broad number of actors and 
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interests to participate in the political debate.18
 
Secondly, influence in the 
political arena does not depend on technical expertise or the ability to conceal 
one’s interests in technical terms, as required in standardization committees 
(Schmidt & Werle, 1993, p. 15; Sirbu & Zwimpfer, 1985). To the contrary, 
technical sophistication rather seems to decrease actors’ chances of being 
heard (Lehmann, 2009). Instead, the political arena favor actors with the 
capacity to link issues to widely accepted core political objectives that are 
hard to contest and can be easily communicated, such as growth, 
competitiveness, employment, sustainability, security etc., and the ability to 
provide political capital to improve the reputations and profiles of elected 
officials in their constituency and within the political institutions. Thirdly, 
political debates appears to emphasize normative (Easton, 1976, p. 129) and 
(re)distributive (Lasswell, 1958) implication of issues rather than joint 
problem solving. As a result the standardization process was perceived as a 
zero-sum rather than a positive game.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper shows that the looming shadow of hierarchy does not necessarily 
need to facilitate industry self-regulation. Where industry’s regulatory 
preferences are heterogeneous and self– or co–regulation usually takes place 
in exclusive circles of limited participation, the shadow of hierarchy is likely 
to have an unintended and counterproductive effect. It will not lead to an 
intensification of self– or co–regulation. Instead the shadow of hierarchy can 
be expected to expose self-regulatory processes to political contestation by 
                                                        
18 In the European Union, for instance, the EP, Commission and Council provide access to a vast 
range of stakeholders including 300 firms and 843 trade associations, 429 citizen interest bodies, 
198 regions, 103 think tanks, 115 law firms, and 153 public affairs firms (Greenwood, 2005; 
Landmarks Publications, 2003; Coen & Richardson, 2009). 
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multiplying the number of veto players and veto points involved in the 
decision-making process.  
However, this should not be mistaken as an argument for laissez faire. 
Governmental actors may very well have an important role to play in 
industry self-regulation, yet the threat of hierarchical intervention is neither a 
sufficient nor necessary for self-regulation to succeed.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Pallet-loading capacity of the ISO 40 foot container  
 
 
 
Table 1: Modal preferences  
 Stack- 
ability 
Top- 
liftability 
Low tare- 
weight 
Pallet- 
width 
High 
cube 
Road   x x x 
Rail    x  
Deep Sea x x   x 
Inland 
waterways 
x x    
Combined     x x 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Pallet-loading capacity of the proposed European intermodal loading unit  
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